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Bioterrorism is the act of releasing bacteria, viruses, parasites, fungi, or other 
biological agents to harm and intimidate targets to promote a cause. These weapons 
can be spread through the air as well as in the form of contaminated food or drink. With 
an estimated cost of up to $26.2 billion per 100,000 people exposed, an act of 
bioterrorism could devastate the United States (Kaufmann, Meltzer, & Schmid, 1997). 
The chance of a bioterrorism event is rising with modern advances in synthetic biology 
techniques. These techniques allow cells and other biological factors to be designed or 
recreated with relative ease. Synthetic biology also allows resurrection of long gone 
pathogens that are no longer guarded against, like smallpox. With modern globalization, 
the new instruments and advances that support the development of bioweapons can be 
shared quickly and efficiently with people all over the world (Ahteensuu, 2017). In the 
wrong hands, these techniques could be deadly. 
Immediately after the anthrax attacks in 2001, America increased funding for 
anti-bioterrorism groups. However, rather than gradually increasing the preparedness of 
public health departments since this time, the number of staff members and sufficient 
laboratories has decreased, reducing the probability of quick and efficient response 
should a biological attack happen. Today, there is still no board or department focused 
on the threat of bioterrorism. In fact, funding for the CDC has dropped 20% since 2008. 
Furthermore, funding for public health emergency preparedness has dropped by $280 
million since the post-9/11 panic (Vaida, 2017). This lack of leadership and resources 
has left the country vulnerable. 
Bioterrorism is a national concern that affects all Americans. Everyone in the 
country is at risk of attack. As of now, five countries have advanced bioweapons 
programs with five or more pathogenic weapons, including Iraq. Syria and North Korea 
have research programs, as well (Patterson, 2013). Bioterrorists do not need to be 
concerned with one specific target or results that are planned in advance. They do not 
even need to get within a close range of their target. Aerosol dispersal mechanisms are 
available commercially and can easily affect a large radius of people. 50 kilograms of F. 
tularensis, the causative agent of tularemia or 'rabbit fever', dispersed by this method in 
a metropolitan area would cause 250,000 deaths. This is an especially important factor 
to consider in public places with large and contained crowds (Pal et al., 2017). 
Concerts, the New York City Subway, the Olympic Games, the Superbowl, or a 
Presidential Address could all be targets. America's food and water supply are also 
potential targets for attack. More than 700 people were sickened in 1984 after the 
Rajneesh cult infected salad bars in Oregon restaurants with Salmonella typhimurium 
(Jones & VanGilder, 2007). Furthermore, the World Health Organization found that if 
just 0.24 kg of botulism toxin was put in a town's water supply, 60% of a town of 50,000 
would be dead in less than 24 hours (Ózsvári, Kasza, & Lakner, 2017).  
The country is unprepared for any biological attack. Funding for local public 
health departments has been dropping, resulting in insufficient laboratories if there is a 
lab at all. The number of people working in public health departments has also been 
decreasing, resulting in a lack of support and an increase in burn out. Approximately 
80% of public health officials are not properly trained in biological agents, microbiology, 
infectious disease, or epidemiology. One expert explained that there was no one in 
charge of securing our country from a bioterrorism attack. Another from John Hopkins 
University’s Center of Health Security noted the lack of persons in the federal 
government accounting for any anti-bioterrorism programs and absence of collaboration 
or coordination between agencies (Vaida, 2017). 
Bioterrorism response deserves its own department that can be solely dedicated 
to combating the problem and to educating and preparing the community. Preventative 
measures save time, money, and human lives. Other solutions will be too little and too 
late whereas proper preparedness could show results in just a few months. Given a few 
years, the United States could have the resources to nip a rising epidemic in the bud 
with relative ease.  
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